The Urge for the East, Hitler, and the British Empire: Why the USSR Should Have Been Destroyed and Colonized
When Hitler came to power in 1933, Europe faced both short and long term threats from the USSR: And Poland’s Pilsudski had repelled the Red Army but this threat lingered, and an existential threat that has played out in reality led to the death of its Empires and ethnic implosion of its peoples. Since before World War II, the Soviet Union gave material and moral aid to Third World assertion and insurgency. Hitler’s effort to reunite the German people and gain living space from a defeated USSR should have been supported.
by Organon tou Ontos
IN EARLY 1933, the peoples of Europe remained ethnically and racially cohesive, and with all of their Empires intact. They had not yet succumbed to the present loss of a will to live or to colonial guilt, ethnic fragmentation, or inundation by racial aliens. Even still, perils loomed: To the West, over the Atlantic, the United States threatened Europe with Americanization and long term ethnic and racial decline and foreign subjugation. In the East lay the Soviet Union, a Communist regime that was now gradually gaining in strength under Stalin. (ILLUSTRATION: Hitler and Chamberlain review a row of German troops in 1938)
But the situation of Germany in early 1933, when Hitler became Chancellor, was worse than the Empires of Western Europe and that of Europe as a whole. Despite holding vast territory in 1918 that had included Poland, Ukraine, two Baltic States, and effective domination of Eastern Europe, it lost these lands and its own territory at Versailles in 1919. Sudetenland was given to Czecho-Slovakia, Northern Schleswig to Denmark, Alsace-Lorraine to France, Eupen and Malmédy to Belgium, and the city of Danzig and the Corridor to Poland.
Adolf Hitler and the National-Socialist movement ended the Versailles Treaty. By January of 1939, Germany had regained the Sudetenland, the Saar province, reunited with Austria, and once again effectively dominated Eastern Europe, was now allied with Italy and Japan, was on the cusp of regaining Danzig and the Corridor, and was reaching for a German-Polish alliance. Hitler rejected any attempt to regain lands lost to the West and North, because he sought peace in the West, a neutral France, and an alliance with the British Empire.
The British Empire had been built up over the course of centuries, with colonial possessions that spanned the globe and included peoples and lands across Africa, India, Asia and the Americas. It was the most powerful commercial nation on Earth, and in the 1930s it retained a native population of unquestioned ethnic preeminence and enjoyed unchallenged national and cultural identity. It counted the United States, the French Empire, and other nations as allies. Now, in 1939, it placed before itself the question of its policy on the Continent.
The British government knew that Hitler’s foreign policy involved two core elements:
1. Reunite lost German peoples and lands back into a single, unified Reich.
2. Secure the future existence of a reunited German people through living space.
Mainstream historical scholarship notwithstanding, there is ample evidence that Britain and the West was acutely aware of both aspects of Hitler’s foreign policy. Hitler’s writings in his book Mein Kampf had made both transparent. Furthermore, Hitler elaborated both elements at various points in speeches, quotes, and discussions, both with members of the German government and with British officials. And above all, Winston Churchill knew what Hitler had intended, because Churchill met to discuss these policies with Ribbentrop in 1937.
Hitler’s aim was public knowledge. Not only had it been published in Mein Kampf, but was the subject of popular writing. In 1937, the same year Churchill met Ribbentrop regarding Hitler’s foreign policies, an article was published in The Atlantic with the title, “Hitler Looks Eastward.” If the citizens of the US, Britain, and the nations of Western Europe believed otherwise, it was not because Hitler had failed to make his intentions clear, but because of deliberate, incessant deliberately misleading propaganda, especially from 1938 :
They remember with regret the vast territory in eastern Europe held by their armies at the beginning of 1918, an empire that stretched from the Gulf of Riga to the Black Sea and contained the raw materials and resources of Poland, Galicia, the Ukraine, much of Rumania, all of Lithuania, and part of Latvia. Looking back through the nostalgic vista of almost two decades, German strategists believe that the German army won the war in the East, then lost it through the mistake of Ludendorff’s costly offensives in the West. That is why Alfred Rosenberg and other Nazi leaders who are advocating the new push to the East preach that the Reich must take a defensive position on the Rhine [from France and the West], and an offensive position on the Niemen, the Danube, the Vistula [facing Poland and ultimately, the USSR].
As such, it cannot be claimed that the British government or people in particular or the West in general was unaware of or misled regarding Hitler’s real intentions. The official policy of “appeasement” formulated by Chamberlain may have appealed only to Hitler’s intent to reunite the German people, and though Churchill may have claimed that Hitler was determined to undermine the British Empire, both aspects of Hitler’s foreign policy was transparent to the world. Even today, seven decades later, historians continue to lie about this reality.
In Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War, Patrick J. Buchanan writes:
Here, then, is the unwritten offer that Hitler had on offer to Britain in 1939: France and Belgium could keep the lands given to them at Versailles: Malmédy, Eupen, Alsace and Lorraine. But Germany would take back the lands and peoples given to the Czechs and Poles in violation of Wilson’s principle of self-determination. Germany would concede the democracies’ dominance west of the Rhine [i.e., Germany would respect the neutrality of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Britain and Western Europe and the United States] if they would cease interfering in the east [i.e. would give Germany a free hand in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union]. Why Britain would reject this, Hitler could never understand. He believed a Germany prepared to confront and block Bolshevism would cause rejoicing in the capitalist West.
This quote is relevant for two reasons: First, with the sole exception of the first sentence, it is a concise summary of the context. Second, it demonstrates how even revisionist writing can deflate, and fail to convey, the transparency of Hitler’s aim. The offer Hitler gave to the British Empire was not “unwritten.” It was clear, explicit, and direct. If it had been unclear to the public in Britain, the US, and the West, it was because of intentional distortions by their governments, especially after 1938, when Churchill’s pro-war bloc gained strength.
Every single action that Hitler undertook on the international stage from 1933 to 1939 which alarmed or disturbed the world should have been uncontroversial outcomes of a transparent foreign policy. This included Hitler’s march into Prague and the removal of Edvard Beneš in early 1939, which was the context of Britain’s abandoning of “appeasement.” In occupying Prague and imposing a Protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia, Hitler not only removed a state that had formed an open alliance with the USSR, but gained a strategic asset.
Now, until 1938 the British government under Chamberlain paid lip service to the facilitation of the first part of Hitler’s foreign policy. But after Germany occupied Prague in early 1939, US Jewry, the leftist and Jewish press in Britain, and Churchill’s pro-war bloc in Britain were able to tap anti-German sentiment without hindrance. The pressure from Jews within the US was the most intense of all. William Bullitt, a Jewish official in Roosevelt’s Administration, intensified US goading of Britain to give Poland a war guarantee and confront Hitler.
As the winter of 1938 flowed into 1939, Hitler’s efforts to reach an agreement with Poland on Danzig and the Corridor faltered on obstinacy in Poland’s Beck. With British “appeasement” dead, Britain was now encouraging Poland not to negotiate with Hitler. Months later, on 31 March, a British war guarantee was offered to Poland. This war guarantee permitted Poland to feel that it would have the military support of the British Empire in the event of war with Germany. Behind the scenes, US Jews and especially Bullitt, were exacerbating the situation.
With the year 1939 in its infancy, only three real choices confronted the British Empire:
1. Oppose Hitler’s foreign policy and militarily confront and oppose Germany.
2. Remain neutral on the Continent and uninvolved in Eastern policy of Germany.
3. Support both elements of Hitler’s foreign policy and aid in their attainment.
It goes without saying that mainstream historians have long argued that not only was Britain obliged to pursue the first option, but that it had no choice but to do so. They argue that the actions and aims of Hitler made pursuing the first option not only desirable but morally and ethically undeniable. It also goes without saying that the standard revisionist position is that the British Empire should have pursued the second option. Neither mainstream historians nor revisionists have ever seriously entertained the possibilities implicit in the third.
Briefly, consider the broad argument for each of the above available choices:
The argument that the British Empire was obliged to pursue the first option is the standpoint of countless British and American historians since the start of World War II. The argument is that Hitler was not only determined to reunite the German people and invade the USSR, but that he posed a concrete threat to Western Europe, the British Empire, and ultimately to the United States. Britain had to go to war because Hitler had to be stopped. If Britain had not stopped Hitler, Germany would had overrun the West and dominated the world.
The revisionist counterargument is that Hitler’s ambitions were far more limited than what mainstream historians have argued. Hitler was not intent on “dominating the world,” as his aim was principally to reunite lost German lands with the Reich. Even in the worst scenario, his expansionist aims were confined to invading the Soviet Union and creating a German land Empire that extended into Eastern Europe and the USSR. This aim, though it will invite opposition and objection, was not a threat to Britain, Western Europe, or the US.
No revisionist historian that I am aware of, and certainly no mainstream historian, has ever considered, much less argued for, the third option. One of the reasons for this is that many revisionist historians, while expressing admiration for aspects of Hitler’s life and Germany in his government, still treat Britain, the US, and the West at the time as some encapsulated norm that Hitler’s Germany fell outside of. By advocating British political and moral distance from Hitler, they sustain agreement with our enemies and constrain revisionism.
There are two factors relevant to my position. The first is that it should be clear exactly what it is that I am arguing for. It is my contention that Britain was morally obliged to support Hitler and both aspects of his foreign policy, given pressing historical and geopolitical realities. The second is that the moral choice that faced Britain had nothing whatsoever to do with its feasibility or practicality. It is not my argument that anyone in the British government was prepared to do this. The normative immediacy of the choice was detached from this.
A nation is nothing more, in its genuine constitution, than the organic aggregate of a folk or people and the land or soil it lives on and occupies. It follows from this that the genuine vital interests of a nation are those that concretely benefit the people that it houses. A concrete or real threat to that people or a genuine alteration in relations with another country that will affect the future livelihood and existence of that people relate to their vital interests. The vital interests of a people and its nation are those that impinge on its weal and existence.
From this vantage point, it must therefore be asked: Were the vital interests of the British people and nation threatened by Germany in 1939? What were the vital interests of Britain in 1939? Was it really the first option, to go to war, or the second, to remain neutral?
Clearly, the decision to go to war with Germany was a fatal calamity and catastrophe for the British people, as well as the German people and the whole of Europe and the West. The British Empire shriveled over the next few decades until nothing was left except pretense to an economic commonwealth and an immigration policy that is now threatening the durability and the very future of the British people. No, the first option was not in the interests of the British people, and therefore it was immoral, utterly detached from all vital interests.
What about the second option, long espoused by revisionists, for Britain to remain neutral and uninvolved in Germany’s foreign policies. It must be remembered that not only was the British government aware of Hitler’s actual foreign policies, but that Hitler had also sought the British Empire as an ally. Instead, Britain allied itself with the nations that hated it the most: The United States and the Soviet Union. Roosevelt saw the British Empire as an outdated anachronism, and Stalin viewed it through the Marxist lens of utter contempt.
Germany, under Hitler, was the only nation in Europe that not only retained a positive view of the British Empire but also saw it as a force for stability in the world and wanted to help preserve it. One of the several points Ribbentrop made to Churchill during their meeting in 1937 was that German armed forces, presumably both the Waffen SS and the Wehrmacht, would use their strength to crush local resistance to continued White British rule throughout the world. Britain disavowal of German friendship was ungrateful and undignified.
Furthermore, a posture of neutrality toward Germany might have left open a prospect, even if it was unlikely, that Germany might be defeated in an inevitable conflict with the USSR. It must be kept in mind that Stalin’s USSR was planning an attack on Hitler’s Germany, and so it was only a matter of time before a German-Soviet conflict would ensue. If Stalin won such a war, Europe would be divided, with the USSR and the USA ultimately using their leverage to undermine Europe’s empires and expose them to inevitable local insurgency.
There is no denying the animus and hatred of the US and the USSR for Europe’s empires and the belittling, demeaning role that Roosevelt and Stalin envisioned for Europe and her peoples. A war with Germany was clearly not in Britain’s interests. But the prospect of its neutrality, though better than war, was also wrought with perils. Germany’s enemies were Britain’s enemies, and as actual history played out, choosing friendship and an alliance with the US and the USSR was ultimately fatal to the British people and to their Empire.
Despite a touted policy of “socialism in one country,” nevertheless, throughout the 1930s, a Soviet policy of increasing moral and material support for Third World leftist insurgency increased. Lip service to racial and ethnic equality in art and ideology reflected a policy of growing support for anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist movements. In short, the USSR was actively seeking to undermine the ethnic and racial status of superiority Europeans enjoyed throughout the world. This intensified following World War II, now with military aid.
Hence, the Soviet Union not only encouraged the implosion of the British Empire through the 1960s, it also actively encouraged forces that have led to mass non-White immigration to Britain in particular and Europe in general. The USSR was not only an enemy of Britain due to any support for Marxist elements in Britain, but because it was actively hostile toward the interests of Britain and Western Europe in their colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Soviet foreign policy, before and after World War II, helped create today’s Europe.
Every single action of Adolf Hitler on the European theater was a step not toward undermining Western Europe or the British Empire, but confronting and defeating the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was the mortal enemy of the British people and the Empire their ancestors had built. It was the unwavering enemy of the empires of Western Europe, and the native peoples of Western Europe. The British government should not only have held to its policy of appeasement from before 1938, but strengthened and expanded it.
If we surmise the possibility that continued non-European immigration into Europe ultimately may imperil the very existence of people of European descent, then the decision to go to war with Germany ultimately traded the existence of the British people for the livelihood and continued existence of the peoples of the Soviet Union. Trading these roles is not a difficult feat. The British Empire should have allied itself with Hitler’s Germany, and tenaciously and feverishly intensified support for colonization and destruction of the Soviet people.
There can be no objection to this that does not take into account the realities confronting the British people in the future and that Britain’s decision to ally itself with Stalin’s USSR meant overlooking Stalin’s past mass murders and condoning or even encouraging postwar mass killings, reprisals, Gulag sentences, and forced relocation and murder of Eastern Europeans and Germans. And this omits any reference to Britain’s own atrocities during World War II, or the countless atrocities that had been committed in centuries of Empire-building.
From every conceivable vantage point, deontological, teleological, and otherwise, the British Empire should have supported Hitler’s foreign policies, allied itself with the Axis countries, and used its resources to abet the destruction and the colonization of the USSR.
Even those nationalists that are willing to argue that Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy should have endured, or even won the war, have engaged in unwelcome apologetics, giving what amounts to apologies for the past. But if we are sincere in our view that World War II was unnecessary, a concomitant of this is that we should, looking back, maintain attitudes of uncompromising support for Hitler’s foreign policies, ourselves. Our genuine interests are not adequately represented by nationalists and revisionists ever willing to compromise.
1. The America of 1933/39 was very different from the America of 2016. It had not yet caved fully into Jewish influence, even though its entry into World War I had been at the behest of Jewish interests. Opposition to US intervention in a possible European war was strong, and European Americans retained their ethnic prominence and unquestioned majority.
2. Both practical and ideological concerns influence Hitler’s eastern policies. The new Drang nach Osten, or “urge for the East,” would fulfill the second part of Hitler’s foreign policy and provide sufficient soil and space for a growing German population to expand into.
3. I am referring to the Skoda arms works, the military assets of Czecho-Slovakia, and the strategic and geopolitical value of the territory in question, all of which were directly relevant and valuable in the buildup of Hitler’s intention to drive East against the USSR.
4. The popular claim that Churchill had special insight into Hitler’s real intentions falters on the inconvenient fact that Churchill knew Hitler had no designs on Britain or the West. Hitler, through Ribbentrop, had offered an alliance and proposed permanent French neutrality.
5. I have seen the third option entertained in hypothetical and alternative history forum, such as in this forum. Even revisionists who do not preface arguments for the second option with standard defamations of Hitler do not offer any consideration of the third option. They seem to believe its lack of feasibility is causally connected to its normative relevance.
6. Though in hindsight, German “domination of the world” appears better, in principle, than the world we are in today. Consider a rising China, nuclear armed Third World nations, and the ethnic and racial decay and death of Europeans. There may be a sense in which claims that Hitler sought to “dominate the world” falter on the obvious realities before us.
7. This same basic tone persists among revisionists, who write to others as if to remind the world that while Hitler was not a threat to Britain, France, or the US, they do not advocate emulating Hitler’s policies in particular or those of fascist movements in general. In doing so, they hope to gain approval from the public, and also Jews, by avoiding advocacy.
8. Britons that most closely approximated the views herein were, on balance, more closely aligned to the vital interests of their people than others. Sir Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists, which advocated not only peace but an alliance with Germany, is one example.
9. Without a war guarantee to Poland on 31 March 1939, and therefore no Polish obstinacy in the face of German offers to return Danzig, it is possible that a German alliance with Italy, Poland, and Britain would at least have been conceptually feasible. Minimally, the prospect of British neutrality and some resolution to the Danzig question might have opened up a front against the USSR, and a one front German-Soviet war concluded c. 1940. With the USSR gone, there would have been no Communist expansion in the Third World.
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Source: Ur-Fascist Analytics