America after the Holy War, part 5
by Revilo P. Oliver
IT IS HARD TO SAY what secret motives may have been in the minds of the advocates of Prohibition. Two old men, one of whom had been the Prohibition Party’s candidate for President early in this century, told me that Prohibition was the only way of breaking the power of the Jews, which, of course, was recognized as already great and formidable before they put Wilson in the White House. I cannot believe that such a motive was consciously entertained on a very wide scale; if it was, it would have made more sense to prohibit Jews, instead of prohibiting alcohol: That would have been a proposition that could have been considered on its merits. The abrogation of the American concept of government was a high price to pay for a covert blow at our resident aliens, even if it had not been illusory.
Of this, Ford himself may have been uneasily aware, for he wrote, with a prescience that must seem impressive now:
In time to come. . . they [the American people] will see how much better it would have been, how much more efficacious and clarifying, if the attack on whisky had included an exposure of the men who had driven whisky out of the country and were selling rank poison as a substitute. The saloon, the brewer, the man who used strong drink were all of them made the target for attack; the Jews who demoralized the whole business went on collecting their enormous and illegitimate profits without so much as their identity being revealed.
The net effect of Prohibition was vastly to increase the “illegitimate profits” of which Ford spoke, and vastly to increase the international nation’s power over every aspect of our national life.
The great criminal syndicates were all owned by Jews, although members of that race seldom appeared in public. The actual work, with speed boats, clandestine distilleries, trucks, and machine guns, was almost entirely done by Sicilian and Irish immigrants or children of immigrants. The most famous gangster of the era was a Sicilian named Capone, who came to have delusions of grandeur and fancy himself a boss in his own right, whereupon his masters neatly eliminated him by having the Federal government convict him of evading income taxes.
I have devoted some space to cursory mention of the significant aspects of the Wilson regime and its aftermath, for it seems to some of our contemporaries that the evidence suggests as a logical inference that Aryans, and specifically Americans, do not have the intelligence to govern themselves and must therefore be ruled by superior races. Perhaps so, but I claim that such an inference was by no means necessary in 1945.
The evidence seemed to show that Americans were not incapable of learning from experience, and that if they battered their heads against a stone wall a dozen times or so, they would come to the conclusion that it had not been a good idea to do so. It took them a long time to learn, but in 1932 they finally perceived that the “Noble Experiment” had been utter stupidity, and, what was more, they had not been precipitated into a fresh wave of madness by the cunning use of the Federal Reserve to create an economic crisis by exploiting the folly of individuals who had contracted enormous debts to purchase stocks or real estate at prices they knew to be far above the current value.
It must never be forgotten that when Roosevelt campaigned for the Presidency, he pledged himself (a) to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment, and (b) to reduce the expenditures of the Federal government by one-third within six months (with the implication of further reductions thereafter). And it was those promises which won for him the election, for even Americans who were most cynical about politics could not believe that they were electing the instrument of a criminal conspiracy who was merely baiting them with promises he regarded as sucker-bait. It was, of course, easy to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment, which had served its purpose, and the thugs it had trained were needed as leaders, organizers, and musclemen in the labor racket and for miscellaneous criminal activity, such as levying blackmail on small business men with threats of violence, to show a need for more police powers in the hands of the Federal government. The important pledge had been to deflate the bureaucracy, which, although minuscule and innocuous in comparison with what is accepted as normal today, then seemed huge and intolerably meddlesome, with the implication of a return to government more nearly American in spirit.
That is what the people voted for. Of course, as soon as the diseased criminal had his hands on the greatest of all instruments of corruption, the US Treasury, and assembled about him a gang of aliens and degenerates, his seizure of dictatorial powers was tolerated by a bewildered and bribed Congress and even by the people who had elected him, partly because he claimed to be able to perform economic magic, but primarily because he had histrionic abilities of the highest order. He was able to charm the simpleminded by reciting scripts prepared for him by the most cunning manipulators of words, and the radio brought his insinuating voice into every American home in recitations which were officially called “Fireside Chats,” but were described by his entourage (and perhaps by himself) as “hog calling.”
But the design to install a Communist regime in the United States had to be carried out slowly, and the conspirators prudently retreated whenever it was obvious that they were trying to go too fast, and even so, the plot would probably have failed, had not the large banks blackmailed the delegates to the Republican convention into nominating a repulsive stooge named Wendell Wilkie to oppose Roosevelt in 1940.
I have tried — and I hope I have succeeded — in explaining to younger readers why an American in the 1930s would be strongly averse to any increase in the powers of centralized government, however great the apparent need for it, and could not sympathize with the fairly numerous Americans who said, “We need a Hitler here.” At the same time, rational men, even if they had the impertinence to disapprove of the National Socialist regime in Germany for the Germans, who had by overwhelming majorities put it in power and enthusiastically maintained it in power, had to concede that there was an enormous moral difference between the German Führer and the American one. Hitler was undeniably an honest man: He had written and published Mein Kampf when he was a political nonentity with a following that numbered at most a few hundred, and when he at last attained power, he did not perform a single act that was not simply the fulfilling of promises he had made years before in a book that everyone had read and could have open before him. He had to be acquitted of even the slightest deception. In glaring contrast, the disgusting occupant of the White House had attained power by the most shameless lying and brazen deceit of which a human being is capable. Of that, there could be no question whatever, since George Orwell’s 1984 was still in the future and there had been no means of destroying and replacing the files of the newspapers that had reported Roosevelt’s campaign speeches.
Near the end of 1939, it is true, this clear contrast was obscured by the grotesque alliance between Germany and the Soviet for the conquest and partition of Poland. Although we can see in retrospect that Hitler’s decision to form a temporary alliance with his implacable enemies was an expedient adopted in a desperate attempt to avert the European war that Churchill, Roosevelt, and their masters were determined to provoke, the effort, which proved to be futile, may have been a disastrous blunder even in terms of the situation in which it was adopted. Certainly, so far as the United States was concerned, the utmost exertions of professional liars would not have availed to arouse antagonism against Germany among Americans, had not Germany adopted that expedient, which permitted hypocritical, but superficially plausible, propaganda that all “totalitarian” governments were alike and even joined by a common interest, that there were no significant differences between Communism and National Socialism (which was called “Nazism”), and that Hitler’s Mein Kampf was, after all, just a device for manipulating Germans, no more honest than the sucker-bait that the Roosevelt gang was using to manipulate Americans. The after-effects of that propaganda are visible even today in the writings of some “anti-Communists,” some of whom, no doubt, are trying to exploit for their own purposes the hostility towards “Nazis” that the Jews have induced in our populace. But although the temporary alliance alienated much American sympathy for Germany, the warmongers, even with the advantage thus given them, failed to achieve their goal.
In 1945, that was another reason for an optimistic belief that Americans could learn from experience. All the putrid propaganda sprayed in their faces from 1939 to 1942 did not suffice to induce the delirium of 1917 and stampede cattle into Europe “to make the world safe for democracy.”
It is true that soon after Roosevelt and Churchill got the war started in Europe, the boobherds were able to induce loud clamoring for American participation by a comparatively small number of Americans, chiefly excitable females, male busybodies whose Christian love for all mankind quite naturally took the form of a passionate blood-lust, and others, who expected the Administration or the Jews to throw them a bone. In a few individuals, the mindless hysteria became so acute as to become ludicrous, but massive bribery was needed to obtain from the Congress consent to various violations of neutrality under the specious pretext of “national defense,” and the great War Criminal had to make public pledges that no American troops would ever be sent abroad or used for any purpose other than the defense of our own territory.
I will add a fact which, although it was politically inconsequential, is of some intellectual interest today, when it seems to be totally forgotten. There was a small group, probably only a few score, of rational men who were prepared to endorse American intervention.
They reasoned that the European war was in itself proof of a fatal declension of our civilization on that continent, comparable to the suicidal struggle for predominance among the Greek city-states, and that the inexorable movement of history made it necessary for the United States to become the Macedon or the Rome of the modern world and to fight for an hegemony that would revitalize the imperialism that our race needs, if it is to survive on a planet on which it is a small and inexorably hated minority.
These thinkers, I need not say, were not unaware of the terrible consequences of imperialism in the brilliant examples of it in Antiquity.
The Macedonian hegemony resulted in the dispersal of Greek genius through the greater part of Asia, where it was eventually absorbed by the prolific natives and forever lost. Rome — involuntarily, for the most part — created, by matchless discipline and courage, the greatest and noblest empire the world has ever known, with the result that the Romans (including all the cognate peoples of Italy) became extinct and were replaced in much of their own empire by their former subjects and slaves, some of them, to be sure, barbarians of our own race, but a majority hybrids or of entirely alien races from Asia Minor and Egypt. Some rational proponents of American intervention in Europe believed that an American Empire could avoid the blunders, now obvious to an historian, that had made the ancient imperialisms ultimately suicidal; others maintained, with an essentially Spenglerian fatalism, that we had no alternative but to assume our destined responsibility and know the glory of empire while marching with virile courage to our eventual doom, centuries hence.
The handful of educated men who held such views are now utterly forgotten, but I mention them to show that it was possible for a rational man to advocate American intervention in Europe, especially so long as it seemed possible (and that was well into 1944) that after some defeats of the previously invincible German armies, an alliance with Germany could be formed for a concerted and inevitably victorious assault on the Soviet, which, even if it had not been a Jewish colony, would nevertheless represent an alien civilization necessarily hostile to us.
The central fact, unmistakable and seeming to promise a fair future for our country, in 1945 was that the most vicious and strenuous propaganda had failed to reproduce the insanity of 1917, and that the United States would never have entered the European War — would never have embarked on what turned out to be an insane Crusade to Save the Soviet — had not Roosevelt succeeded in tricking the Japanese. And it did not seem unreasonable to assume that the American majority, which had proved itself immune to the propaganda, would react appropriately when they discovered how they had been deceived by the great War Criminal and for whose benefit he had expended our money and our lives.
As many ranking American military men said privately when we first shipped troops to Europe, we fought “the wrong war at the wrong time,” but when the war was over in 1945, it was possible to draw up a balance sheet that was by no means discouraging.
On the credit side there were two great achievements:
1. We had effectively destroyed the power of the Japanese and decisively humiliated them. The only non-Aryan nation that had dared lift its hand against our race had been eliminated as a military power — and the example of its ruin would convince intelligent Asiatics that, however insanely our race might indulge in absurd civil wars (for in their eyes that was what wars between our nations amounted to), we had the power and the will to destroy our biological enemies, if they presumed to dispute with us the mastery of the Earth.
2. We emerged from the war as the greatest military power on the planet — not merely mightier than any other nation, but, in sober fact, mightier than all other nations combined. Our dominion was absolute. Whether we had wished it or not, whether it was entirely good or not, we had become, in fact, the great imperial power, the masters of the world. Seneca had been right: Ducunt volentum fata, nolentum trahunt.
On the debit side (remembering that the losses we had suffered and had inflicted on the Europeans were events that had happened and could not be altered, by penance or prayer) there was only one considerable item:
1. We had failed to destroy — we had even insanely saved from destruction — our eternal enemy, the Soviet Empire, which was then the principal possession of the international nation. But that was an error which, though deplorable, could be quickly corrected.
Despite the massive support that we had given them — much of it by treason, for the preference given the Soviet over our own armies had needlessly cost us the lives of many of our men — the barbarians were prostrate and virtually helpless. They could not have offered more than a temporary resistance to the will of the nation that now unquestionably had the power to determine the future of all other nations on the globe. It was taken for granted that as soon as we realized what we had done, we would destroy the Soviet menace. And when we did that, we would deal with the instigators of our blunder, the enemy aliens in our country, at least as efficiently as we had neutralized the Japanese population — and it seemed likely that we would be less kind, when the guilt was so much greater.
The balance sheet, therefore, seemed to be conclusively — overwhelmingly — in our favor. At least it seemed so to me, and that is why, in the autumn of 1945, as the Capitol Limited rushed westward, I entertained no doubt whatsoever about the future of the American people, which was now assured by a manifest destiny inherent in the very facts of the contemporary situation.
(to be continued)
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Source: America’s Decline