The Zionization of American Foreign Policy
NO POPULATION GROUP exerts a greater influence over American foreign affairs than American Jews. Considering the overflowing support given Israel to the increasing detriment of our relations with the Arab and Muslim world, considering that our president has become an almost full-time negotiator for Israeli and Jewish interests, it would be hard to underestimate the impresario role of Jews in shaping America’s international affairs. Historians and most pundits, when they admit this overriding influence at all, define it as a relatively new phenomenon, one that was not really manifested until World War II and the birth or rebirth of the Jewish state. Nothing could be further from the mark. The Jewish input into American foreign policy began long, long ago.
A logical point of departure might be President Madison’s appointment in 1815 of Mordecai Noah, a Philadelphia-born Jew, to the post of American consul in Tunis. Noah, described as a loud, sharp-tongued, irritating, insistent man prone to self-dramatization, controversy and showmanship, was a journalist political reporter and quasi-literary light who fantasized about founding a Jewish homeland in the New World. Pending the implementation of this pipedream, Noah decided he could serve his precocious Zionism best by entering the foreign service as America’s first Jewish diplomat.
Noah arrived in Tunis during America’s second war with Britain, at the time the Barbary Pirates were capturing U.S. ships and holding crew and cargo for ransom. Almost his first act was to arrange the release of four Americans from prison for a sum of $5,000 which he advanced out of his own pocket. Since the expenditure was not authorized, it could be surmised he was engaged not in a patriotic act, but in a private business venture. His next move was to try to nullify a British treaty with the Bey of Tunis, in which the latter promised not to purchase or acquire British ships captured by any “Christian state.” When the British protested the sale of a British prize captured by an American warship, Noah said the British had no case because the United States was not a Christian state. Its citizenry, he explained, included Jews.
It is not known how the dispute was finally determined. What is known is that after Noah sought to get his $5,000 back from the American government, he was dismissed from his post because his “religion was deemed inappropriate for the execution of his consular duties.” “Shocked,” Noah protested his dismissal and stirred up a hornet’s nest of rhetoric in Washington, charging that the president had wounded the religious feelings of “the entire Jewish nation.” Finally his money was returned along with a statement from the State Department saying his activities in Tunis, though unwise, were not dishonorable, and that his Jewish religion, as such, was not the grounds for his dismissal.
After failing to convince John Quincy Adams to make him American ambassador to Austria, Noah concentrated on some visionary plans to establish a Jewish community in Grand Island, New York. At the same time he was also revving up a campaign to persuade the sultan of Turkey to create a Jewish homeland in Syria and Palestine. After none of these maneuvers had borne any fruit except cute little news stories and sentimental editorials, Noah spent the tag end of his life as a playwright, sheriff and political wardheeler.
In 1840 the first blatant lobbying effort to mobilize American power and prestige on behalf of world Jewry was undertaken by Isaac Leeser, like Noah born in Philadelphia, who persuaded the federal government to protest to the Turkish sultan about an alleged ritual murder in Damascus. A Capuchin monk named Thomas had mysteriously disappeared and seven Jewish elders were arrested and accused of homicide. Leeser sent a petition to President Martin Van Buren demanding that the U.S formally complain to the sultan about the matter. The ambassador dutifully obliged — without avail.
In 1857 another “Jewish problem” arose over a U.S. treaty with Switzerland which regulated the travel of Swiss and Americans into the two countries. Although one article stated only Christians could enter and leave Switzerland, no one paid much attention to this diplomatic sleeper until an American Jew asked for an extension of his residence permit in the canton of Neuchatel. When he was turned down, Jewish organizations in the U.S. rose like one man to his support and injected the State Department into the dispute. President Buchanan promised to do what he could, but not until 1874 was the imbroglio laid to rest by a revised Swiss constitution.
Next came the Mortara incident. In 1858 Papal gendarmes abducted a seven-year-old boy from an Italian-Jewish family in Bologna. Six years previously a Catholic nursing sister had baptized the child when he lay very sick in a hospital. She had hoped the conversion to Christianity would save his life. Years later when she revealed what she had done, the Vatican spirited the Mortata boy away from his non-Christian parents. American Jews helped to orchestrate the worldwide outcry. Once again Washington tried, but accomplished little. The young Mortara was taken to Rome, reared as a Catholic and, when he came of age, refused to acknowledge his Jewish ethnicity and spent most of his life as a missionary.
Here we might interject that some influence on America’s external affairs was exerted by Southern or Confederate Jews. The country’s first Jewish senator, David Levy Yulee, played an active, behind-the-scenes role in the war with the Seminole Indians and in pre-Anschluss Florida, where he had vast land holdings in the vicinity of St. Augustine. It is believed that he was Florida’s richest citizen when the flat, sandy, bug-ridden peninsula was made a state in 1845. Like Judah Benjamin, the foreign minister of the Confederacy, Yulee hitched his wagon to the stars and bars of Dixie and in the end lost most of his wealth and status.
In the latter half of the 19th and the early part of the 20th century most of the Jewish interference in American foreign policy was inspired by Russian anti-Semitism or what American Jews perceived to be Russian anti-Semitism. Since 1832 America had a treaty with Russia regarding trade, travel and passport matters, which assured Americans traveling in Russia the same rights as those enjoyed by Russian citizens traveling in the U.S. But there was a troublesome (to the Jews) clause that stated voyagers in Russia had to observe and adhere to all local ordinances and regulations, some of which specifically limited the activities of Russian Jews. Moreover, when American Jews of Russian origin visited Russia, they were occasionally treated as Jews rather than as Americans, because Russian citizens did not lose their citizenship when they emigrated. In 1894 one of these emigrants, John Ginzberg, returned to Russia to visit his parents. There he was arrested and jailed by Russian officials who charged him with evasion of military service and with having obtained American citizenship without the Czar’s approval. Friends and relations of Ginzberg lost no time in notifying the State Department, which in turn asked the American ambassador in St. Petersburg to look into the situation. Although the envoy’s heart was not in the complaint, the Russian government relented and released Ginzberg, just as 85 years later it was to release another Ginzburg, the half-Jewish, anti-Soviet dissident. As tit for tat, however, the Czar’s government passed a new regulation forbidding visas to indigents. This roused Jewish organizations everywhere to a new fury. The demand was made that either Russia honor the original treaty as written or Washington should abrogate it.
The tactic, which characterized almost all future diplomatic issues involving Jews, was to magnify anti-Jewish acts of foreign powers into a deliberate assault on the constitutional guarantees of the U.S. When appropriate, Jews, who were the least religious of American population groups, defined themselves as members of a religion, so the appeals for support could be made on religious grounds. At other times they merely described themselves as American citizens, so that mistreatment of American Jews would be immediately translated into mistreatment of all American citizens. An extra dividend of this racial lobbying was that it not only improved the situation of American Jews by increasing their political and financial power, but also often bettered the lot of “persecuted” Jews abroad. As is readily apparent today, this tactic has been developed into a fine art.
Theodore Roosevelt was perhaps the first American president to react swiftly and effectively to Jewish wirepulling. In 1902 he delivered a rather pompous protest to the Rumanian government, which had promulgated and enforced various quotas and restrictions aimed at curbing Jewish dominance in the country’s finance and trade. The next year, when Czar Alexander II refused to accept a B’nai B’rith petition about Jewish rights in Russia, it was considered an insult because the petition was accompanied by a memorandum from President Roosevelt himself. As a token of things, many things, to come, Roosevelt then leaked his memo to the press in order to win Jewish voter support in the upcoming presidential election.
It was not until the diplomatic skullduggery of New York banker Joseph Schiff that Jewish influence on American foreign policy and, for that matter, on the foreign policy of most other great nations became overpowering. In 1904 Schiff had a meeting in London with Sir Ernest Cassel, an affluent Jewish speculator and close friend of Edward VII, and the Japanese ambassador to Britain, Korekijo Takahashi. Japan wanted a loan of 10 million pounds for her war against Russia. Schiff, because of his hatred of the “anti-Semitic Czars” eagerly participated in the loan and later raised other loans for Japan that amounted to $200 million. This money, according to observers, practically guaranteed Japan’s victory over Russia — the first time in modern history that a Mongoloid state was the winner in a war with a White nation, an event that stimulated anti-White racism throughout Asia and hastened the demise of European empires in Asia and Africa. By supporting the Yellow race against the White race, Schiff had set a dangerous precedent that may eventually boomerang on his own people, whose property and security have always been based on the protection of White governments.
When World War I came along, Schiff refused to subscribe to a loan to Britain, France and Russia, until he was assured that “not one cent” would go to the Czarist government. When Czar Nicholas II was overthrown in the February 1917 revolution, he sent millions of dollars to Kerensky. That he sent additional money to subsidize the Bolsheviks after the October revolution has been charged.
The State Department, when under the control of intelligent and wide-visioned statesmen like John Hay and Elihu Root, had never been too enthusiastic over constant Jewish meddling on behalf of Jewish interests all over the world. American diplomats wondered why Jews, as most other immigrants had done or were doing, could not simply settle down and become Americans. In the end Theodore Roosevelt himself grew tired of incessant Jewish agitation against Russia and asked Jacob Schiff if he really desired America to declare war against the Czar.
In the 1908 presidential race Taft fished for Jewish votes and financial support by promising he would send an ambassador to St. Petersburg who would solve the nagging, as yet unresolved problem of Russian passport regulations circumscribing the movements of foreign Jews. After the election was over, Taft, realizing that cancelling the American-Russian treaty would hurt America more than Russia because the trade balance was heavily in America’s favor, conveniently shied away from his campaign promises. After a stormy meeting at the White House, which did not produce the necessary reassurances, Jacob Schiff refused to shake Taft’s hand. This led to Taft’s remark that he was president of all the people of the United States and was not afraid of Jews, no matter what their power.
Taft quickly learned what later presidents have come to consider the basic lesson of American politics — that Jews have clout with a capital C. Shortly after the White House get-together they mounted a massive mailing campaign that reached every public figure in America. Almost overnight, the demand in the House of Representatives for the abrogation of the Russian treaty reached deafening proportions. When Taft ignored it, the House voted 301 to 1 to cancel the treaty. The Senate vote was almost as lopsided. Driving into a corner and hoisting the white flag to Jewish racism — the standard operating procedure of all subsequent twentieth-century presidents — Taft signed an order in December 1911 abrogating the treaty. Russia reacted by tightening its restrictions on Jews and directing its profitable trade with America to other European countries. The loss to American business did not bother American Jews, any more than did the Arab boycott brought about by unlimited American military aid to Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Jews were ecstatic about their discovery that American foreign policy was not made in the State Department, but in the Congress and in the White House, two branches of government that could easily be persuaded to adopt policies against the national interest by a combination of financial help at elections, unrelenting media and organizational pressure, and bribes in the form of speakers’ fees at Jewish fund-raising meetings.
It was a lesson that would not be lost, and one that set the pattern for a great deal of American diplomacy from then on. As America became a world power, Jewish influence grew accordingly. Jews played a considerable part in the entrance of the U.S. in World War I after the Allies had promised to create a Jewish homeland in Palestine and after the Kerensky revolution and the abdication of the Czar had made Russia an “acceptable ally.” Jews played an overwhelming part in the entrance of the U.S. in World War II, after the massive media propaganda campaign against Hitler had swamped the neutralist leanings of a majority of the U.S. population.
Today American Jews no longer have to exert pressure on Congress and the president to get their way in foreign policy. In the age of Kissinger, they assumed a commanding position in the State Department itself. As Miles Copland quotes a retired ambassador in his book Without Cloak or Dagger (Simon and Schuster), “Any diplomat who dares to suggest in his reporting that Israel is not 100% right and the Arabs 100% wrong is taking his career in his hands.”
Copland further reports that foreign officer James Keeley was demoted for commenting “disrespectfully” on the Zionist movement, and that David Nes was forced to resign because he chided the State Department for its “uncritical” support of Israel.
Copland adds, “two senior diplomats in Arab capitals were forced to resign because of charges of moral turpitude brought to the State Department by congressmen who had obtained them from ‘unnamed sources’ who, upon investigation, turned out to be Zionists. There have been at least five cases…in which cleverly fabricated cases of sexual misbehavior or financial malfeasance were made out against officers who were generally believed to entertain an anti-Zionist bias.”
What Copland doesn’t say is that Jewish foreign service officers, who used to be kept away from posts in Israel because of their Zionist loyalties, are now a majority — three out of four — in the political section of the embassy in Tel Aviv. Jews are also taking over more diplomatic posts in the Arab world, not only in Morocco and Tunisia, but in some of the hostile Arab states surrounding Israel, although, as the Jewish Sentinel reports, “they don’t go around admitting their background.”
Like so many facets of American life, the “old boy” club of Ivy League WASPs that dominated the State Department is long gone, along with such race-conscious Majority members as Joseph Grew and Loy Henderson. No one in State today would dream of being as outspoken as Under Secretary William Phillips, who described his opposite number in Moscow as “a perfect little rat of a Jew, born in Buffalo and utterly vile.” Former ambassador to Poland, Hugh Gibson, delineated the Soviet ambassador there as a “slinky little rat…said to be an Armenian Jew.” William R. Castle, once head of the Western European division of State, used to amuse his colleagues with memoranda about Jewish vulgarity and their “appalling power and business and finance.”
By the late 1970s, the tables were completely turned. State, which in regard to Middle Eastern affairs, became little more than an adjunct of the Israel foreign office and reliably gives diplomatic endorsement to Israeli imperialism and racism, thereby earning the growing hostility of nearly a billion Arabs and Muslims.
On the record, any reasonable person would assume that Jews have made such a mess of American foreign policy that they would bow out and let wiser and more innovative men take over. Instead, just the opposite is happening. The more Jews bring the U.S. to the brink, the harder they push. In a century and a half the leitmotiv of American foreign policy has turned from non-entanglement to permanent entanglement, from victory everywhere to defeat everywhere, from the Monroe Doctrine to the Kissinger Doctrine, from America first and foremost to America last and hindmost.
And all the while, White Americans take it and take it and take it.
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Source: Instauration magazine, March 1980